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NOTES AND COMMENT
INDORSEMENT OF CORPORATE CHECKS BY CORPORATE OFFICERS.
The courts of this state have generally held, where an officer
or agent of a corporation transferred by indorsement checks pay-
able to the corporation to his individual bank account, that the bank
receiving the deposit was liable to the true owner.1 These decisions
are grounded on the fact that the form of the check was notice to
the bank that the officer or agent contemplated diversion of the
corporate property to his own use, thus placing upon the bank the
duty of making inquiry so as to ascertain the extent of the agent's
authority. In a recent New York case, a check was diverted into
the account of another corporation of which the endorsing officer
was also the president and the question there raised was whether
such facts sufficiently warned the bank of an impending diversion
so as to render it liable for failure to make due inquiry.2
In Wen Kroy Realty Co, Inc. v. The Public National Bank and
Trust Company of N. Y., the plaintiff corporation had entrusted
its president with the general management of its business. He in-
dorsed a check payable to it in its corporate name, placed his own
signature beneath as president and procured his son to sign as
secretary. In fact, his son was not and never had been secretary
of the plaintiff corporation. This check he then indorsed in the
name of the Silvo Amusement Corp. of which he was also the presi-
dent and deposited it in this corporation's account with the defen-
dant bank. It was collected by the defendant through the regular
channels. Silverman, the president, withdrew the funds through
the Amusemenf Company's account and appropriated the avails to
his own use. The plaintiff sought to hold the defendant liable for
the conversion of the check, and was permitted to recover. The
Court held that "the defendant bank receiving a check purporting
to be indorsed by two officers could not have relied upon an ap-
parent power of the president which the president did not represent
that he was exercising." 3
"The president of a business corporation has prima facie au-
thority to do any act in the ordinary conduct of the business which
the board of directors could have authorized him to do, where the
persons with whom he deals have no knowledge of an actual lack
of authority, and no sufficient reason for doubt." 4 This rule pre-
'Wagner Trading Co. v. Battery Park Nat. Bank, 228 N. Y. 37,126 N. E.
347 (1920); Weissman v. Banque de Bruxelles, 254 N, Y. 495, 173' N. E. 837
(1930); Moch Co. v. Security Bank, 176 App. Div. 842, 163 N. Y. Supp. 277(1st Dept. 1917); Buckley v. Lincoln Trust Co., 72 Misc. 218, 131 N. Y.
Supp. 105 (1911).2 Wen Kroy Realty Co., Inc. v. The Public National Bank and Trust Com-
pany of New York, 260 N. Y. 84, 183 N. E. 93 (1932).
Ibid. at 92, N. E. at 76.
'ELLIOT, PvrATE CoRPoRAxioNs (5th ed.) §529A; ROSBROOK, NEW YoRic
CORPORATIONS §417; Hardin v. Lithog.aphic Co., 247 N. Y. 332, 160 N. E. 388(1928).
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supposes that the agent is acting in the interest of his employer and
the scope of the authority may not be enlarged by implication to
justify the diversion to the agent himself of the principal's prop-
erty.5 Thus, the right to indorse corporate paper is limited to in-
dorsement for corporate purposes.6 But if the officers or agents
of the corporation have authority to transfer corporate paper by the
form of indorsement used, such indorsement by such officers or
agents transfers the title of the corporation to the paper, even though
the transfer is not made in furtherance of corporate purposes.7  So,
an officer or agent of a corporation authorized to indorse corporate
paper in blank although only for the purposes of deposit in the
corporation's bank account, can pass good title to such paper to a
bona fide purchaser ;8 but where the authority was restricted to in-
dorsing for deposit only, an indorsement in blank constituted a
forgery so that no title could pass thereby.9 It is clear then that
where no actual authority exists the attempted transfer constitutes
a conversion and no title will pass unless the transferee is entitled
to -rely upon the apparent authority of the agent. 10
It has been held that the payee of corporate checks who receives
them from the treasurer of the corporation in payment of the offi-
cer's individual debt is chargeable with notice of the agent's in-
capacity to issue them and is bound to inquire as to the real situa-
tion." So, too, where the president of a corporation procured a
check payable to its order, and having endorsed it in the corporate
name, by himself as president, delivered it to the defendant in pay-
ment of a personal loan, the Court held the defendant liable on the
5 Porges v. United States Mtge. and Trust Co., 203 N. Y. 181, 96 N. E. 424
(1911).
'Wagner Trading Co. v. Battery Park Natl. Bank, supra note 1.
' Salen v. Bank of New York, 110 App. Div. 636, 97 N. Y. Supp. 361 (1st
Dept. 1906); Cluett v. Couture, 140 App. Div. 830, 125 N. Y. Supp. 813 (3d
Dept. 1910) ; McCabe v. Chelsea Exchange Bank, 183 App. Div. 441, 170 N. Y.
Supp. 759 (1st Dept. 1918).
' Cluett v. Couture, ibid.
'Standard S. S. Co. v. Corn Exchange Bank, 220 N. Y. 478, 116 N. E. 386
(1917) ; Judge Pound states the rule to be, at 481, N. E. at 387:
"Any person taking checks made payable to a corporation which can
act only by agents, does so at his peril and must abide by the consequences
if the agent who indorses the same is without authority, unless the cor-
poration is negligent or is otherwise precluded by its conduct from setting
up such lack of authority in the agent.
"If the original indorsement was authorized, the diversion of the
funds after indorsement would not make it a forgery; but if the original
indorsement was unauthorized, parties dealing with the wrongdoer and
innocent -parties alike were bound to know the lack of the agent's author-
ity to convey title away from the true owner to anyone."
"0 Wagner Trading Co. v. Battery Park National Bank, supra note 1.
"Rochester R. R. v. Paviour, 164 N. Y. 281, 58 N. E. 114 (1900); the
Court said at page 285, N. E. at 115: "There was a shadow on the checks, and
the defendant could not, in good faith, accept them until it disappeared."
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theory that the presumption arising from the face of the check was
that it belonged to the corporation and that its president had no
right to use it to pay his personal debt.12
The deposit of a corporate check in the personal account of the
indorsing officer has been held, from the very nature of the trans-
action, to be notice to the bank of an unwarranted diversion.'8 Based
on this rule was tile result reached in a case where a check entrusted
by a corporation to its treasurer for deposit was cashed for the
treasurer, the bank being rendered liable on the theory that one who
accepts checks payable to a corporation does so at his peril and
must abide by the consequences if the agent who indorses the same
is without authority. 14 Where the deposit has been to the indors-
ing officer's personal account, other jurisdictions have generally held
the bank liable on the theory that the form of the check was notice
sufficient to put it on guard or that its act in receiving- the check
amounted to negligence.15
It is apparent that in all the cases discussed, the transferee had
constructive notice, at least, at the time of the transfer, that the
agent purporting to act on his principal's behalf or with his author-
ity, was himself an interested party. This follows from the nature
of the transaction itself, as where the check is received in payment
of or as security for a personal debt, or to deposit in a personal
account. But where the check is deposited in the account of an-
other corporation of which the indorsing officer is an interested
member, the dual interest of the officer does not appear on the check
itself, and extrinsic circumstances must be proven to show the bank
had notice. In Niagara Woolen Co. v. Pacific Bank,16 two cor-
porations were involved. But in this case some ninety-odd checks
were diverted, not a single, isolated transaction as in the Wen Kroy
case. Moreover, the name of the corporation in whose account the
checks were deposited was that of the indorsing officer. These were
the grounds upon which Justice McLaughlin concurred, while two
'Ward v. City Trust Co., 192 N. Y. 61, 84 N. E. 585 (1908).
" Moch Co. v. Security Bank, supra note 1.
"4 Staten Island Lodge v. Staten Island Savings Bank, 223 App. Div. 859,
228 N. Y. Supp. 859 (2d Dept. 1928) ; but where a check made payable to cash
is presented by an officer of a corporation authorized to sign checks for such
corporation, to a bank for payment in cash, a bank has no means of knowing
from a mere inspection of the check that the proceeds are going to be subjected
to larceny or conversion by the one presenting the check for payment-Broad-
way Boxing Club, Inc. v. Bushwick National Bank, 127 Misc. 515, 216 N. Y.
Supp. 713 (1926).
" Toronto Club v. Imperial Trust Co. of Canada, 25 Ont. L. R. 330 (1911);
Underwood, Ltd. v. Bank of Liverpool, 1 K. B. 775 (1924); Dennis Metal
Mfg. Co. v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 99 N. J. L. 365, 123 Atl. 614 (1924);
McIntosh v. Detroit Savings Bank, 247 Mich. 10, 225 N. W. 628 (1929); cf.
Parker Gordon Cigar Co. v. Liberty National Bank, 134 Okla. 286, 273 Pac.
269 (1928).
" 141 App. Div. 265, 126 N. Y. Supp. 890 (1st Dept. 1910).
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judges dissented entirely.' 7 It will thus be seen that although the
bank was held liable, the majority of the court did not assent to
the proposition that the mere form of the check was sufficient to
put the bank on inquiry, but on the contrary, expressly negatived
such a view. In Bank of Benson v. Gordon,'8 two corporations
were also involved. A note payable to one corporation was left as
collateral security for a loan to another corporation. Here the bank,
however, had actual knowledge through its cashier that the officer
who indorsed the note to the bank was the president and principal
stockholder of both corporations, and that he was using the prop-
erty of one corporation to secure the debt of another.
On the other hand, other jurisdictions have not subjected subse-
quent takers to the duty of making inquiry under such circumstances.
It has been held where a note was drawn by one firm and indorsed
by a member thereof to another firm of which the indorsing officer
was also a member, that subsequent holders of the note did not take
with notice of any contemplated diversion or defect in the title
thereto.19 It has also been held where an officer of a corporation
indorses corporate papers to a partnership of which he is a member,
that subsequent takers did not have sufficient notice of any diversion
of corporate property to impose liability upon them.2 0  In a case
decided in our own state it was held that the blank indorsements of
corporate officers following their official signature upon a check pay-
able to the corporation and which was thereafter diverted into the
account of a third person, did not constitute notice to the bank re-
ceiving the check.21 Judge Page affirming the decision said,22 "The
mere fact that the check bore the personal indorsement of the offi-
cers of the corporation did not show an appropriation of the pro-
ceeds thereof to their own personal use, nor was that fact alone
sufficient to put the defendant upon inquiry and charge it with
knowledge of any fact such inquiry would have disclosed."
The Court in the Wen Kroy case has in effect gone further
than the prevailing rule. The decision as a practical matter places
'Ibid. at 271, N. Y. Supp. at 894, the dissent went upon the ground that,
"in all the cases relied upon to sustain the rule which it is proposed to apply in
this case, there has been present the important fact, which is absent here, that
the bank or individual to whom the diverted money was paid received it in pay-
ment of a debt, or in some other way reaped a benefit from the payment, thus
becoming with notice, an active participant in the diversion. Where that fact
has been absent, as for instance in a case like the present, where the bank was
a mere conduit or collecting agency, asserting no title to or right to retain the
money for its own advantage, a different rule has uniformly been adopted."
103 Neb. 508, 172 N. W. 367 (1919).
:'Miller v. Consolidation Bank, 48 Pa. 514 (1865); Walker v. Trenholm
and McKee, 14 S. C. 142 (1880).
Sit re Troy and Cohoes Shirt Co., 136 Fed. 420, aft'd, 142 Fed. 1038
(C. C. A. 2d, 1906).
"' Lasker v. Mutual Bank of Roseville, 194 N. Y. Supp. 379, aff'd, 201 App.
Div. 333, 194 N. Y. Supp. 381 (lst Dept. 1922), aft'd, 234 N. Y. 550, 138 N. E.
442 (1922).
= Ibid. at 334, N. Y. Supp. at 382.
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upon banks the duty of analyzing every check offered for deposit
by a corporation, and investigating the purposes of the indorse-
ments thereon. This we submit is placing too heavy a burden
upon banks for what in most instances amounts to negligence
and laxity upon the part of corporate officers and stockholders. The
decision is moreover not in keeping with recent expressions of our
courts. 23  The tendency has been to narrow the limits of liability
of banks for fraudulent acts of trustees and agents in dealing with
their principal's property. The Court does not appear to have given




The mortgagor is entitled to the rents and profits of the mort-
gaged premises after the institution of foreclosure proceedings and
pending a sale therein.1 This right is consistent with the equitable
theory of mortgages adopted in this state 2 and the abolition by
statute of the mortgagee's right to maintain ejectment upon the
mortgagor's default.3 There are, however, limitations to this right;
for, having acquired jurisdiction over the property the court may
appoint a receiver thereof to collect the rents and profits, and hold
them for application on account of the debt, in the event of a de-
ficiency. 4 Provision has been made for such appointment, by the
legislature in specified instances, 5 but the courts of equity have long
exercised the power independent of the provisions, and are not lim-
ited in its exercise to the cases there enumerated. 6 The interven-
tion of equity to relieve from forfeiture, resulting in the drastic
changes in the law of mortgages, was not designed to secure con-
tinued use of the property and drain of the profits, to the default-
' Whiting v. Hudson Trust Co., 234 N. Y. 394, 138 N. E. 33 (1923);
Empire Trust Co. v. Cahan, 274 U. S. 473, 47 Sup. Ct. 661 (1927).
' Syracuse City Bank v. Tallman, 31 Barb. Ch. 201 (N. Y. 1857); Whalen
v. White, 25 N. Y. 462 (1862); Rider v. Bagley, 84 N. Y. 461, 465 (1881);
Wyckhoff v. Scofield, 98 N. Y. 475 (1885).
2 Trimm v. Marsh, 54 N. Y. 599 (1874); Howell v. Leavitt, 95 N. Y. 617
(1884); Barson v. Mulligan, 191 N. Y. 306, 84 N. E. 75 (1908); Becker v.
McCrea, 193 N. Y. 423, 86 N. E. 463 (1908).
'N. Y. C. P. A. §991.
'See cases infra note 7; as to application of rents, Syracuse City Bank v.
Tallman, smpra note 1; Cincinnati Nat. Bank v. Tilden, 22 N. Y. Supp. 11, aff'd,
140 N. Y. 620, 35 N. E. 891 (1893) ; Continental Ins. Co. v. Reeve, 149 App.
Div. 835, 134 N. Y. Supp. 78 (2d Dept. 1912).
'N. Y. C. P. A. §974 (adopted from §713 of N. Y. C. C. P. which is dis-
cussed in Hollenbeck v. Donnell, infra note 6).
'Hollenbeck v. Donnell, 94 N. Y. 342 (1884).
